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I. INTRODUCTION
In March and July of 1992, the accounting firms of Deloitte and Touche and
Peat Marwick were sued for $150 million and $100 million, respectively, in
connection with audits of bankrupt thrift clients. 1 Arthur Andersen was
recently targeted with, and is currently defending, a $400 million lawsuit
involving one of its failed financial institution clients.2 In late November of
1Gail D. Cox, Unlimited Liability Accountants' Legal Expense is Fuzzy, but the Bottom
Line is Clear: Damages are Exploding, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 1, 22.
2Suit is Said to Bar Arthur Andersen from Contract Bid, N.Y. ThMEs, Aug. 26, 1992, at
D1. Arthur Anderson, as a result of this malpractice allegation, was barred from
competing for a twenty million dollar government contract. This is another example of
the adverse economic impact experienced by professional firms as a result of the current
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1992, Ernst & Young ("E&Y") settled all of the government's claims against it
arising out of the failure of several of its savings and loan institution clients for
$400 million.3
Like these accounting firms, law firms similarly suffer. Early in 1992, the law
firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler settled with government
regulators for $41 million amid allegations of malpractice by their firm which
had advised the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan.4 Blank, Rome, Comisky and
McCauley, a Philadelphia law firm, settled with the FDIC for $61 million for
alleged legal malpractice arising out of its representation of a failed thrift.5
The plaintiff initiating these lawsuits is typically the government because
most of the thrift failures have resulted from misconduct by the institution's
officers and/or directors. These insiders could not successfully sue the outside
professionals for negligence or malpractice since the insiders' knowledge of
and, in fact, perpetration of the activities that led to the thrifts' demise would
be used to show lack of causation and reliance on the advice provided by
outside professionals.
Typically, either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC') or
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") will be the particular government
regulatory agency that initiates litigation. Specifically, the FDIC is responsible
for pursuing claims arising from thrift failures before January 1,1989.6 The RTC
is responsible for pursuing claims against thrifts for which successors in
interest were appointed between December 31, 1988 and October 1, 1993.7 For
3 John H. Cushman, Jr., $400 Million Paid by S & L Auditors, Settling U. S. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al. The terms of the settlement did not include any admission
of wrongdoing by Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young, however, did agree to change some
of its accounting practices, and three of its partners are now prohibited from providing
professional services to federally insured financial institutions.
Deloitte & Touche has been reportedly negotiating with the government to resolve
approximately $1.4 billion in claims from the failure of some of its financial institution
clients. Alan Breznick, Ernst's Action Presses Otlwrs to Settle Suits, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Nov.
30, 1992, at 1.
4 Donna K. H. Walters, New Liability Twist has Lawyers, Accountants Scurrying, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at Dl. Kaye, Scholer's settlement represents the largest payment
from a law firm to date in connection with its advice to Lincoln. It settled with the
government for $41 million in March of 1991. Marcia Coyle et al., Hard-HitAccountants
Hope to Limit Liability, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 5.
SFDIC Collects $61 Million from Legal Firm, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Apr. 15, 1991, at
8. The large recoveries are not confined to lawsuits by the government. The law firm of
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue paid $24 million to bondholders of the American
Continental Corporation to settle fraud claims arising out of the nation's largest thrift
failure, Lincoln Savings & Loan Association. $87 Million to Settle S & L Claims, Bus. INs.,
Apr. 6, 1992, at 2.
6 A comprehensive article by Kathryn A. Oberly and Melanie T. Morris outlines the
various claims that may be brought by the FDIC, RTC and the Office of Thrift
Supervision. Kathryn A. Oberly & Melanie T. Morris, Accountants' Liability in Connection
with Failed Financial Institutions, 767 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 261 (1992).
71d. The RTC will be dissolved in 1996 and the FDIC will succeed to its claims. Id.
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the sake of simplicity, "FDIC" will be used throughout the article to refer to both
governmental agencies.
The enormity of verdicts and settlements does not necessarily paint a
realistic picture regarding the true scope of auditors' or attorneys' culpability
for the failure of this country's thrift institutions. 8 However, in its zealous quest
to make someone pay for thrift failures, the government has vigorously
pursued the institutions' outside professionals. This so-called "deep pocket"
phenomenon of including accounting and law firms with large revenues and
insurance coverage virtually guarantees collection of immense verdicts.9 In
view of the flood of lawsuits that have been and continue to be filed against
outside professional firms, the firms' abilities to defend against the
government's customary claims of negligence and professional malpractice
has become a vital issue.10
A common touchstone of professional firms' defensive strategies is the
assertion that the culpable officers and directors of the thrift institution did not
rely on the challenged information supplied by the defendant firms.11 Any such
lack of reliance must necessarily be imputed to the thrift institution itself as the
8The lack of sufficient federal government S & L examiners, and concealment of
fraudulent activities from outside auditors and attorneys by managerial wrongdoers,
not the malpractice by outside professionals, is the root cause of financial institution
failures. Daniel F. Kolb & Michael P. Carroll, Lawyers, Accountants Not Responsible for S
& L Crisis, MICH. L. WKLY., June 24, 1992, at 19.
The authors state: "The combination of frequent articles that tend to exaggerate the
role of accountants and lawyers and continuing announcements of massive damage
claims could easily leave the impression that the accountants and lawyers who had
financial institutions as their clients are... ultimately to blame for the current crisis." Id.
9 One reason for the explosion of lawsuits against professional firms is the
government's lack of success in pursuing claims against the officers and directors
responsible for orchestrating the fraudulent schemes. In contrast, the government is
finding "very deep pockets in accountants and lawyers." L.H. Otis, E&Y Settlement Saps
E&O Market, in THE NAT'L UNDERWRITER Co. 30 (Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits
Mgmt. ed., 1992). See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
10Patricia A. McCoy, Emerging Theories of Liability for Outside Counsel and Independent
Outside Auditors of Financial Institutions, in EMERGING ISSUES IN THE "NEW" BUSINESS OF
BANKING 219 (PLI Com. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-637, 1992); see also
FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166,170 (5th Cir. 1992)(stating that reliance is necessary
to establish causation in professional negligence action for allegedly faulty audits);
Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990)(reasoning that
client's reliance on the accountant's representations is essential element of action based
on alleged negligence in providing accounting services). These cases are consistent with
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977), which provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment,
• .. supplies false information for the guidance of otlers in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the infornation, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
Id. (emphasis added).
11 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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institution can only function through its managers. Consequently, when the
governmental agency as receiver or assignee institutes negligence actions that
could have been brought by the thrift against outside professional firms, it
should be subject to the same defenses, namely, the negation of the reliance or
causation elements, that the failed thrift would have faced.
In FDIC v. Ernst & Young 12 and FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers,13 the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, respectively,
reached dramatically different results on these issues when faced with very
similar fact scenarios. 14 In Ernst & Young, the Fifth Circuit held that the FDIC,
as the assignee of the defunct Western Savings Association, was unable to
sustain a claim of negligence against Ernst & Young because the FDIC would
be subject to the same defenses as the failed thrift, namely lack of reliance. 15 In
contrast, in O'Melveny the Ninth Circuit held that the FDIC, as the assignee of
the defunct American Diversified Savings Bank, was able to sustain a
negligence claim against O'Melveny & Meyers because the FDIC would not be
subject to the same defenses as the failed thrift, including lack of reliance.16
Those courts that have barred a reliance defense where the government sues
as receiver have favored a policy of compensating the government for losses
by shifting losses onto innocent or marginally culpable professional firms. 17
This has been accomplished by elevating the FDIC to a special status above
that of an ordinary assignee.18 As a result of this classification, those courts
have held that the FDIC is immune from imputation in situations where
ordinary assignees would not be.19 This reluctance to hold governmental
plaintiffs subject to defenses that would be valid against the thrifts, in turn, has
severely crippled professional liability defendants in their efforts to defend
against such claims. 20
12 FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), reh'g, en banc denied, 976 F.2d 732
(1992). See infra note 159 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit refused to vacate, and
the decision is still good precedent.
As part of the recent $400 million settlement agreement with Ernst & Young, the
FDIC required Ernst & Young to join in its petition to the Fifth Circuit to vacate the
decision. The rationale behind the FDIC's approach is fairly obvious. Aside from its
adversity, the decision represents a potential turning point in litigation that has
overwhelmingly favored the FDIC.
13 FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (unanimous opinion).
14 See discussion itifra Part II.
15 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169-72.
16 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 748-49, 751-52.
17 See discussion infra part V.A.
18 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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This note proposes that the Fifth Circuit's opinion in handling these claims
provides a better rationale than the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The first factor
examined is the degree of control exercised by the corporate officer(s) who had
been aware of the financial woes that the outside professionals allegedly
overlooked. 21 The second factor discussed is whether the insiders' misconduct
was for or against the institution.22 Finally, policy considerations will be
evaluated to determine whether the FDIC should be accorded the special status
that immunizes it from defenses which could have been asserted against the
failed thrift through imputation from the thrift's internal wrongdoers.23 On
remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit should adhere
to the Fifth Circuit's rationale.
II. BACKGROUND - ERNST & YOUNG AND O'MELVENY
The primary conflict between the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits arises from
the FDIC's need to prove justifiable or reasonable reliance by failed institutions
on audits, placement memoranda and other documents, as a component of
causation in professional liability claims. Ordinarily, reasonable reliance is
essential to a plaintiff's prima facie case, but the Fifth and Ninth Circuits take
different views on the necessity of proving this required element when the
government is the plaintiff.24
In a typical professional negligence action, causation must be proved as part
of a plaintiff's prima facie case. In the context of a professional negligence
action, the plaintiff may state the causation component in this way: But for
reliance by the institution's officers or directors on negligent professional
advice, certain risky loans, investments, acquisitions, etc., would not otherwise
have been undertaken by the institution. This reasonable reliance component
of causation is negated, and the prima facie case is defeated, where the insiders
are perpetrating their fraudulent activities with full awareness of the
institution's true financial condition.
21 See infra part m discussing under what conditions knowledge of wrongdoers may
be imputed to the institution under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in FDIC v. Ernst &
Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
22 This factor is referred to as the "Cenco test," derived from Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). Sec discussion infra part
IV.
23 See discussion infra part V.
24 FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992)(stating that reliance must be
shown in a negligence action brought by the FDIC to establish that alleged faulty audit
was a substantial factor in bringing about the thrift's failure); FDIC v. O'Melveny, 969
F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992)(reasoning that lack of reliance by failed thrift's owners would
not be a valid defense against FDIC in a negligence action for policy reasons), rev'd and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
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A. FDIC v. Ernst.& Young (The Fifth Circuit Opinion)
In Ernst & Young, the FDIC sued E&Y for alleged negligence in connection
with E&Y's audits of the financial statements of Western Savings Association,
a failed Dallas thrift.25 The theory of the FDIC's case was that Western's losses
would have been avoided if E&Y had promptly detected the thrift's
insolvency.26 According to the FDIC's complaint, for the year ended 1984,
E&Y's audit showed that Western's net worth exceeded $41 million, when, in
fact, the thrift was insolvent by more than $100 million.27 Similarly, the 1985
audit indicated a net worth of more than $49 million while, according to the
FDIC's complaint, the thrift was actually insolvent by more than $200 million.28
Throughout this period, the thrift was wholly owned by a sole shareholder,
Jarrett E. Woods.29 Woods was also chairman of the board of directors, chief
operating officer, and chief executive officer, in addition to holding several
subordinate offices.30 Woods' lending and investment policies were very risky
and, as a result, the thrift's financial position became increasingly unstable.31
Eventually, Woods' practices drove Western into insolvency.32 In light of the
fact that Woods was solely responsible for perpetrating the unsound lending
and investment policies, he did not need, nor would he have wanted, E&Y's
advice that Western was insolvent. Accordingly, Woods did not rely on the
purportedly incorrect audits.
Based on Woods' extensive control status at Western, including his 100%
ownership, the Fifth Circuit imputed his lack of reliance to Western.33 Further,
the Court reasoned that the FDIC as assignee stood in Western's shoes and was,
therefore, limited to instituting claims that Western could have brought and
subject to the same defenses that Western would have faced. 34 Accordingly, the
Court affirmed summary judgment for E&Y on the FDIC's claims.
Aside from the Fifth Circuit's adherence to well-settled corporate law
principles, its disposition of this case, on summary judgment, has important
potential implications for future cases.35 By granting summary judgment, the
Fifth Circuit established that, as a matter of law, there was no material issue of
2 5 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 168.
26 1d. at 169.
2 71d. at 168.
281d. at 171-72.
291d.
30Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 168.
31 Id.
32 1d.
33 d. at 171.
34 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
35 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169.
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fact, with respect to imputation or the FDIC's status as assignee of Western.36
Since neither Woods, nor the thrift could have relied upon E&Y's audit to
establish causation, the FDIC, in Western's shoes, could not establish the
reliance element of its negligence claim. 37
B. FDIC V. O'Melveny & Meyers (The Ninth Circuit Opinion)
In O'Melveny & Meyers, the FDIC sued the Los Angeles law firm of
O'Melveny & Meyers for alleged professional malpractice in connection with
legal services provided to a failed savings and loan, American Diversified
Savings Bank.38 Specifically, the FDIC alleged that O'Melveny's assistance in
preparing private placement memoranda (PPMs) and its due diligence work
to confirm the accuracy of certain disclosures were the negligent cause of
American Diversified's losses.39 Similar to the allegations in Ernst & Young, the
PPMs supposedly did not provide a realistic picture of the thrift's true financial
condition, which was tenuous.40
The intemal fraud in O'Melveny was perpetrated by three officers who
owned all of the thrift's stock.4 1 According to the FDIC, Ranbir Sahni, the
chairman and chief executive officer of American Diversified, Lester Day, the
president, and Wyn Pope, an executive vice-president, engaged in fraudulent
bookkeeping to disguise their activities. 42 Specifically, the thrift's assets were
overvalued and its profits were inflated by sham sales.43
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no imputation of
knowledge to the thrift from the trio, since they were distinct entities from the
thrift.44 According to the court, the three wrongdoers were not the thrift.4 5
O'Melveny further opined that even if the knowledge was imputed to the thrift
36 The Fifth Circuit's disposition of this case on summary judgment demonstrates
that the court discerned no material issue of fact regarding the FDIC's status as an
ordinary assignee.
That determination could be followed by other courts to prevent the FDIC from
advancing its special status argument in future, similar cases. This potential for future
adoption of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning illustrates another reason why the FDIC
attempted to have the decision vacated. See supra note 12.
37 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 166.
38 FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and
renianded, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
391d. at 746.
40 1d. at 747.
41 Id.
42 1d. at 750.
43 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750.
44 1d.
45Id.
1994]
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from the officers, the knowledge would not be imputed to the FDIC.46 The court
examined policy reasons relating to compensating victims and punishing
wrongdoers and concluded that the FDIC should be accorded special status. 47
Because the court did not consider the FDIC to be an ordinary successor in
interest, it held that the conduct of the officers could not operate to subject the
FDIC to the same defenses that the thrift would be subject to if the thrift was
asserting the claim of malpractice.48
The remaining sections of this article will explore the reasoning of the Ernst
& Young and O'Melveny opinions in greater detail. Specifically, closer analysis
will reveal that the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is sounder than the Ninth Circuit's
judicial legislation. First, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approaches for
determining whether knowledge should be imputed to the failed thrift will be
discussed. Second, the Circuits' different approaches to the "on the behalf' test
will be analyzed. Finally, the desirability of the policies furthered by the Fifth
Circuit's approach over the policies arguably advanced under the Ninth
Circuit's approach will be examined.
III. FIRST FACTOR - WHEN SHOULD THE KNOWLEDGE OF COMPANY OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS BE IMPUTED TO THE ENTITY?
As exemplified by Ernst & Young and O'Melveny, many financial institution
failures are the result of fraud perpetrated by an institution's internal
management. According to Ernst & Young, the first step for a professional firm
seeking to advance a successful imputation argument is to impute knowledge
of the thrift's managers who perpetrated fraud or misappropriated funds, to
the thrift.49 Although a corporation possesses a legal identity of its own,
without its officers or directors, it cannot carry on its activities. Under certain
circumstances, when the controlling shares of the institution or the bulk of the
managerial activities are concentrated with one individual or a group of
individuals, the perpetrators' knowledge necessarily becomes the thrift's
knowledge. According to the Fifth Circuit, the requisite control to demonstrate
this knowledge is established by demonstrating either one hundred percent
ownership or a sufficient level of operational control to equate the officer's
knowledge with the institution's.50 There is a divergence among courts,
46 d. at 751.
4 7 d. at 751-52. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit with
respect to its articulated policy of according special status to the FDIC. O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048,2054 (1994).
48 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 752.
49 FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1992).
50Id. at 171. The court emphasized that Woods was the sole stockholder of Western
"and, as the FDIC's complaint stated, Woods 'dominated and controlled Western's
board of directors from the time he took control of Western."' Id.
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however, as to what level of control under the second approach will be
sufficient to impute the wrongdoer's knowledge.51
In Ernst & Young, the Fifth Circuit held that at a minimum where a sole
stockholder commits fraudulent acts, the officer is, as a matter of law, the alter
ego of the entity.52 It is understandable, then, that the Fifth Circuit in Ernst &
Young imputed Woods' knowledge to Western as he owned one hundred
percent of Western's stock. 53 It is far from understandable why imputation was
precluded by the Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny where the wrongdoers collectively
owned one hundred percent of American Diversified. Similar to Western which
could only act through its sole stockholder Woods, American Diversified could
only act through its controlling shareholders. 54
Despite the similarities of ownership and control between Ernst & Young and
O'Melveny, the Ninth Circuit took a radically different approach to imputation
from that of the Fifth Circuit.55 The ownership factor that was so integral to the
Fifth Circuit's analysis was not even addressed in the Ninth Circuit opinion,
even though the three individuals perpetrating the fraudulent activities owned
one hundred percent of American Diversified. 56 The Ninth Circuit decided that
51 The Fifth Circuit, in FDIC v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82 (1972), for example, refused to impute
knowledge from the president and controlling shareholder to the failed Lorenzo State
Bank. Imputation was primarily rejected for two reasons: (1) the president was not the
sole stockholder; and (2) the president was not in sole control of the thrift's activities.
Id. at 87-88.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has moved away from the wooden approach used in
Lott. In Wellington v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 778 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1985),
the financial institution was precluded from recovering on a bond even though the
wrongdoer was a vice-president who owned only forty percent of the thrift's
outstanding stock. Id. at 1110-11; see also FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1550 (10th Cir.
1992)(stating that "if an employee was acting within the scope of his authority then his
fault would be attributed to the FDIC"); American Standard Credit v. National Cement
Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981)(reasoning that knowledge of mere employee of parent
corporation who was an officerof a subsidiary corporation might be sufficient to impute
knowledge from subsidiary to parent).
52 For the impact that this alternative has had on various decisions considering
imputation see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
53 Other decisions that support the proposition that a sole stockholder is the
institution include: FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 947 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1991);
Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967);
McKee v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 316 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1963); see also 3
WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § § 809,814
(perm. ed. 1986).
54 FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
551d. at 752.
56Id. But see California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d
556, 565 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that Sahni and Day owned all of the outstanding
stock of American Diversified and that the pair "completely dominated and controlled"
the bank).
1994]
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where a single individual owns almost all of the stock, there should be no
imputation when that person acts adversely toward the thrift.57 That
reasoning, however, focused the inquiry on only one of the wrongdoers instead
of the trio of wrongdoers. When the inquiry is properly focused on the trio's
activities and the group's total ownership is recognized, the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning is flawed. Its failure to even discuss the crucial ownership factor
reveals a weakness in its imputation analysis. Unlike the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Ernst & Young, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is faithful to neither
settled corporate principles nor common sense.
In addition to imputing Woods' knowledge based on his one hundred
percent stock ownership, the Fifth Circuit also imputed his knowledge based
on his control over Western. 58 The court recognized that Woods held all of the
important positions of control and power at Western including chairman of the
board, chief operating officer, chief executive officer, and various committee
seats at Western and its wholly-owned subsidiaries. 59 In view of Woods'
operational control, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "the privity and
knowledge of individuals at a certain level of responsibility must be deemed
the privity and knowledge of the organization . . . [and] the level of
responsibility must extend at least to the sole owner who dominated the board
of directors."6 0
This reasoning is well-taken. As previously mentioned, a corporation can
only act through its individuals. This is true whether the individuals act
responsibly or fraudulently. Thus, one hundred percent stock ownership
should by no means be the only basis for imputation. Otherwise, the knowledge
of controlling managers could not be imputed to the institution, despite their
defacto control over the company. Many courts have adopted the alternative
imputation approach suggested by the Fifth Circuit which focuses on
operational control.6 1
57 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 751-52.
Both O'Melveny and California Union arose out of the insolvency of American
Diversified. In California Union, the government argued that the wrongdoers "so
completely dominated and controlled ADSB" that they were inseparable from the thrift
for purposes of the discovery rule, and thus, the limitations period for the claim should
be extended. 948 F.2d at 565. In contrast, the FDIC in O'Melveny argued that the
wrongdoers and American Diversified were distinct entities and thus that no
imputation of knowledge could occur. O'Mlveny, 969 F.2d at 750. See also discussion
infra part V., pp. 22-29.
58 FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
59 1d. at 168.
60 1d. at 171 (emphasis supplied).
61 See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541,1550 (10th Cir. 1992)(stating that "if an employee
was acting within the scope of his authority then his fault would be attributed to the
FDIC"); American Standard Credit v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 271 (5th Cir.
1981)(reasoning that knowledge of mere employee of parent corporation who was an
officer of a subsidiary corporation might be sufficient to impute knowledge from
subsidiary to parent); Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d
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In addition to emphasizing Woods' ownership interest, the Fifth Circuit
considered Woods' domination and control over Western's activities. 62 This
suggests that even if Woods was not the sole owner of the thrift, the control he
exerted over Western through his various offices and other positions would
have been a sufficient basis for imputation. This "operational" approach is
sound because rigid formulae, which emphasize percentages or shares of stock,
will not fairly or consistently inform the imputation analysis since it is rare that
the culpable insiders who have defacto control over the institution will also be
the sole owners of the institution. More flexible approaches that examine the
realities of the internal structure of an entity are more likely to accurately reflect
the extent of wrongdoers' control over the organization and lead to imputation
when it is justified.
Under an operational approach, both the Ernst & Young and O'Melveny fact
situations would support imputation. The officers involved in both of those
cases changed investment policies, lending practices, and underwriting
policies to perpetrate and perfect their fraudulent schemes.63 The domination
of such areas by the parties rises to the level of control necessary to establish
imputation to the institution.
IV. SECOND FACTOR - WERE THE ACTIONS OF THE WRONGDOERS ON BEHALF OF
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION?
Once the Fifth Circuit court in Ernst & Young determined that the
wrongdoers exercised sufficient control to justify imputation, the court
assessed whether the wrongdoers' fraud was "for" or "against" the institution,
a test derived from Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidnan.64 Under Ernst & Young's
approach, if the institution is the primary beneficiary of the wrongdoers'
scheme, knowledge will be-imputed from the wrongdoers to the institution.
65
In Cenco, a corporation sued its outside accounting firm, Seidman &
Seidman, for professional malpractice, fraud and breach of contract. 66 The
plaintiff alleged damages resulting from managerial fraud that was not
detected by Cenco's outside auditors.67 Specifically, the managers had
245, 250 (4th Cir. 1967)(stating that "[o]rdinarily knowledge of officers and directors
having substantial control of all activities of a corporation is imputed to the corporation
... [h]owever, such is not necessarily true if [they] do not have the requisite control.").
62Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171.
63 See discussion supra parts 11A, f.B.
64686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). "[T]he primary costs
of a fraud on the corporation's behalf are [not borne] by the stockholders... and the
stockholders should not be allowed to escape all responsibility for [fraud committed by
officers]." Id. at 456.
651d.
66 Id. at 451.
67 Id. at 451-52.
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fraudulently inflated Cenco's inventory values.68 As a result of the inflated
inventories, Cenco presented a misleading picture of improved financial health
that enabled it to command higher stock prices, acquire other companies, and
borrow money at lower rates.69 Eventually, the fraud was revealed by a newly
hired financial officer who reported Cenco to the SEC.70 The specific claim
against the defendant-accounting firm alleged that either the auditors should
have uncovered the fraud or the auditors did know of the fraud but failed to
report it.71 Seidman & Seidman, however, showed that they had been diligent
in their attempts to follow-up signs of fraud, i.e., they had satisfied their
professional duty. Seidman & Seidman further showed that managers at all
levels of responsibility at Cenco, who participated in the fraud, had prevented
Seidman & Seidman from actually discovering the fraud.72
The jury instructions in Cenco stated that "the acts of a corporation's
employees are the acts of the corporation itself if the employees were acting on
the corporation's behalf."73 Cenco argued that these instructions improperly
focused the jury's attention on the actions of Cenco's managers, not Cenco's
conduct. 74 By focusing on Cenco's knowledge and existence as a separate
corporate entity, the plaintiff-corporation hoped to convey the image that the
corporation was innocently manipulated by the actions of its managers.
Therefore, Seidman & Seidman would be unable to defend against the
corporation the way it was able to defend against claims by managers, officers
or directors. The court rejected Cenco's argument and held that the auditors
could validly assert defenses against Cenco that were viable against Cenco's
managers based on the imputation of knowledge from the wrongdoers to
Cenco. 75
In order to arrive at. its decision, the court examined state tort liability
objectives and an auditor's professional duties regarding fraud detection in the
context of a claim brought by a corporation where fraud was perpetrated by
corporate officers. The two objectives to be served through tort liability, as
stated by the Cenco court, are compensation of victims of misconduct and the
68 Id.
69 Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451-52.
70Id.
7l1d.
72Id. at 456.
731d. at 454. Unlike Ernst & Young and O'Melveny, the wrongdoers in Cenco occupied
various positions in upper-level management. Thus, the levels of responsibility were
somewhat lower in Cenco as compared with Ernst & Young and O'Melveny in which the
wrongdoers occupied high-level officer and director positions. The Cenco court would
apparently reject a distinction based on the different levels of responsibility since the
thrust of its reasoning was premised on preventing enrichment of the wrongdoers.
74 Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
75Id.
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deterrence of future similar misconduct.76 In the case of a corporation, a
judgment for the corporation will not compensate the corporation directly.77
Rather, the judgment will be distributed among its owner(s). 78 Thus, the
"victim" to be compensated by a recovery for a corporation is not actually the
corporation, but rather, its stockholder(s).79
The Cenco court considered whether recovery would be limited to the actual
victims of the managers' fraud. The potential beneficiaries of any recovery
consisted of several categories of stockholders, some of whom were actual
participants in the fraudulent activity.80 Since a judgment would not
distinguish among those categories, active participants in the fraud would also
benefit.81 In the court's view, "such a judgment would be perverse from the
standpoint of compensating the victims of wrongdoing."
82
With respect to the second objective of tort liability, deterrence, the Cenco
court observed that shifting the cost of the fraud from Cenco to the accounting
firm would not deter the type of fraud at issue.83 The scheme was perpetrated
by members of the board, vice-presidents and other top-level managers, within
the corporation.84 If the company could simply shift its losses under these
circumstances, the incentive to hire honest managers would be lost, as would
the incentive to monitor managers' activities.8 5 By the same token, the court
noted that the high-level pervasiveness of the fraud involved in Cenco made it
especially difficult for independent auditors to detect. In short, under Cenco,
not holding a company liable for its failure to hire honest managers and
76 1d. at 455.
77 Id.
78 d. The court noted that the undisputed facts showed that the fraud "permeated"
the top management at Cenco. Id. Under those circumstances, the court reasoned that
the corporation should not be able to shift the entire responsibility for the schemes to
the outside auditors. Id.
79
"Auditors are not detectives hired to ferret out fraud .... Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
Though the court acknowledged the validity of Cenco's argument that the victims, in
this case stockholders, should be duly compensated, it did not agree that shifting the
loss, by prohibiting imputation, to the accountants would best accomplish this goal.
Specifically, the court determined that Cenco could not separate itself from the internal
wrongdoers. Id. at 456. "If Seidman failed to police its people, Cenco failed as or more
dramatically to police its own." Id.
801d. at 455. "To the extent [that the corrupt officers] are still stockholders in the
company, they would benefit pro rata from a judgment in favor of Cenco." Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451.
85 Id. at 455.
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monitor their conduct is a less acceptable outcome than holding the auditors
liable for failure to uncover such fraud.86
Another important consideration was the fact that the immediate effect of
the fraud was to help, not harm, the shareholders. According to the Cenco court,
"[f]raud on behalf of the corporation is not the same thing as fraud against it."'87
As noted by the court, fraud against the corporation injures primarily the
stockholders. 88 For example, fraud against the company would include theft
or embezzlement, activities that deplete the assets of the corporation. 89 Fraud
which benefits the corporation, "aggrandizes" the corporation, and primarily
injures outsiders such as insurers and prospective stock purchasers. 90 An
example of this would be the creation of artificial profits or inventory values
through bookkeeping entries. Nothing is being taken out of the corporation's
asset pool in this example, yet the financial entries purport to convey an image
of profitability or wealth that does not truly exist. Through the use of this false
image, potential investors, for instance, may feel secure in purchasing stock
which may later prove to be worth substantially less than the purchase price.
Important to the Cenco court's analysis was the fact that the wrongdoers were
not defrauding current stockholders.9 1 Since the defrauded stockholders were
new purchasers, the company was receiving money from outsiders, which
served-at least initially-to actually benefit or increase the monetary assets of
the corporation. The court noted that, in spite of the fact that the corporation
or its stockholders may not be net beneficiaries once the fraud is revealed, the
fraud is nonetheless beneficial to the corporation. 92 The participants turned the
"company into an engine of theft against outsiders - creditors, prospective
stockholders, insurers, etc."93
The Fifth Circuit in Ernst & Young applied the Cenco test to the FDIC's claim
and found that Woods' fraud benefited Western.94 In making this distinction,
8 6 d. at 456.
8 7Id.
8 81d. at 456.
8 9Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451, 454.
9 0 d. at 456.
9 11d. at 456. But see FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1992)
(conduct which aggravates "a corporation's insolvency and fraudulently [prolongs] its
life does not benefit that corporation"), rev'd and remamed, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994); Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[TIhe prolonged artificial insolvency of
[the thrift] benefited only ... managers and the other alleged conspirators, not the
corporation."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
92 Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
93 d. at 454.
94 FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the crucial fact was that Woods was the sole stockholder and therefore, Woods
was Western. 95 Given this dual identity, any fraud that benefited Woods,
necessarily benefited Western, albeit temporarily.96 The victims of the fraud in
Ernst & Young were its depositors and creditors, outsiders of Western. 97 Any
recovery for the FDIC, as receiver standing in Western's shoes, would
effectively reward Woods, the only stockholder, for his misconduct. Deterrence
would not be enhanced by a recovery for the receiver because, similar to Cenco,
the outside auditors were dependent on the information provided by Woods
in forming opinions about the financial health of the thrift.98 In future situations
where a thrift client is wholly owned by an individual, an outside auditor will
still be limited in its ability to follow up on "red flags" by the information
supplied by the individual. Because Woods, and thus, Western, was fully aware
of Western's deteriorating financial condition, the Fifth Circuit expressly
rejected, as a matter of law, the FDIC's claim that proper performance of audits,
as opposed to the allegedly improper ones prepared by Ernst & Young, would
have alerted Western to Woods' fraud.99 The court stated: "Western cannot
claim it should recover from E&Y for not being rescued by a third party for
something Western was already aware of and chose to ignore."1°°
The Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny, also relied on Cenco to inform its imputation
analysis. 101 The Ninth Circuit's treatment of Cenco, however, cannot be squared
with the Fifth Circuit's entirely different treatment of that case. The court did
not consider that the wrongdoing trio owned one hundred percent of American
Diversified's stock.1°2 The O'Melveny court, instead, evaluated the trio's
fraudulent activities, which consisted primarily of "cooking the books" through
overvaluation of the thrift's assets.103 The Ninth Circuit then determined that
these activities were against the thrift's well-being, not for it, as required for
95Although not addressed by the court in O'Melveny, the Ninth Circuit did consider
this ownership in California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d
556 (9th Cir. 1991). See discussion infra pp. 27-28.
96 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171. Utimate success or failure, under Cenco, is not the
determinative factor for deciding whether an action is taken on behalf of an entity. Cenco,
686 F.2d at 449.
97 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171.
98Id.
991d.
lO0ld.
101FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
102 1d. at 746.
1031d.
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imputation under Cenco.104 Further, the court stated that the wrongdoers
benefited from their activities. 105
The court failed to articulate, however, in what capacity, other than as owners
of American Diversified, the trio benefitted. Thus, if their activities benefitted
them, for example, by increasing the apparent value of their ownership shares
in American Diversified, the trio's benefit was inextricably linked with the
beneficial increase in profitability that the thrift experienced as a result of the
overvaluation activities. The Ninth Circuit's emphasis was placed on the
ultimate condition of the institution, insolvency and receivership, to support
the conclusion against imputation.106 The court also reasoned that even if the
thrift somehow benefited, there could be no imputation since recovery would
best serve tort objectives. 10 7 The O'Melveny court concluded, without
explanation, that recovery by the FDIC "would best serve the objectives of tort
liability by properly compensating the victims of the wrongdoing .... ,-108
The Ninth Circuit's Cenco application, thus, cannot be reconciled with the
Fifth Circuit's approach because on virtually identical facts, completely
opposite results were achieved. Ernst & Young, for example, placed heavy
emphasis on Woods' controlling ownership share.109 O'Melveny did not even
consider the ramifications of nearly identical control interests. 110 The three
inside perpetrators of the fraud in O'Melveny collectively owned all of the
thrift's stock and were controlling officers.111 Just as Woods was Western, Sahni,
Day and Pope taken together were American Diversified. Nonetheless, the
O'Melveny court ignored the controlling ownership interests held by Sahni,
Day and Pope in determining whether they acted on behalf of the thrift.
The Fifth Circuit, in Ernst & Young, also emphasized the extent of operational
domination exercised by Woods in its decision whether to impute his
knowledge to the thrift.112 As Western's president, chairman, chief executive
officer and vice-president, Woods was necessarily acting on the thrift's
104 d. at 750.
105Id.
106 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750-51. See also Steve E. McConnico et al., Failed Financial
Institutional Litigation: The Expanding Scope of Liability, 12 REV. LrriG. 537 (1993)
(criticizing the O'Melveny court's formulation of an imputation test which focuses on
hindsight rather than the intentions of the wrongdoers).
1071d.
1081d. at 750.
109FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
110FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744,750 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and renzanded,
114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
111
"Sahni and Day owned all the stock [of American Diversified] and held key
positions." California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 565
(9th Cir. 1992).
112 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171.
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behalf.11 3 In contrast, O'Melveny gave no weight to the operational domination
of Sahni, Day and Pope even though they occupied essentially the same
positions of authority and control as Woods. 114
Another sharp difference between the Fifth and the Ninth Circuit's
treatments of Cenco involves whether the institution's ultimate failure means
that the underlying fraud was against the corporation.11 5 In O'Melveny,
imputation was rejected because "disaster, not benefit' accrued to the thrift as
a result of Sahni, Day and Pope's activities. 116 The Ninth Circuit court relied
on this long-range effect in concluding that the activities were not on behalf of
American Diversified. 117 In contrast, despite the fact that the long-term
consequence of Woods' fraud was Western's financial demise, the Fifth
Circuit's Ernst & Young decision recognized an imputation defense because in
the short-term Woods had benefited and, therefore, Western had benefited. 118
The Ninth Circuit's contrasting focus on the long-term effects of the fraud
is wholly inconsistent with Cenco's reasoning. In Cenco, the Seventh Circuit
expressly held the company was not a net beneficiary of the internal fraud.
Thus, the auditor's defenses were sustained even though Cenco ultimately
failed.119 The Cenco court held that in order to best serve tort liability objectives,
the proper focus for imputation was not the net result, but rather, who was
most responsible for the wrongdoing and whether they would participate in
any recovery.120 Indeed, if the focus was the net result, as in O'Melveny,
knowledge could never be imputed, since it is the company's collapse into
insolvency which usually precipitates these actions. 121 Rather, by focusing on
the wrongdoers, fault can appropriately be determined and, in the case of
financial institutions where at least part of the fraud was internally perpetrated,
fault will not be unfairly shifted to innocent or far less culpable parties, such
1131d.
114 0Melveny, 969 F.2d 744.
115 See supra parts H.A, II.B.
116 0'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 747.
1 171d. at 750.
118 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 168.
1 19 Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880(1982).
120 d. The Cenco court characterized the ultimate failure to achieve a net beneficial
result as a question of damages. Id.
12 1The point is this: It is the institution's failure that serves as the triggering event in
this type of litigation where the government must step in for an insolvent thrift. Thus,
by focusing on the "net" result, the Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny overlooked the
obvious-the net result had to be insolvency, otherwise, there would be no litigation.
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as outside auditors or attorneys, who, in fact, might have been misled by the
wrongdoers themselves. 122
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the faulty rationale of O'Melveny in
light of the better reasoning of Ernst & Young, decided on strikingly similar
facts. It seems much more equitable to premise imputation from wrongdoer(s)
to the institution on traditional corporate principles where the wrongdoer(s)
had either the necessary ownership control or operational control to establish
that the wrongdoer(s) was the corporation. This approach avoids
result-oriented holdings and represents the better application of the Cenco test,
which, as shown by the Ninth Circuit's O'Melveny decision, may be
manipulated to prevent imputation in almost any case arising from an
institutional failure. 123 The Ninth Circuit chose not to consider the ownership
or control of the wrongdoers in O'Melveny and interpreted Cenco to mean that
ultimate failure precluded initial imputation of knowledge. On remand, the
Ninth Circuit should adopt the sounder rationale of the Fifth Circuit in
connection with its consideration of the imputation issue.
In situations where the requisite basis for imputation is established either
through ownership or operational control, a separate Cenco analysis is
superfluous in determining whether knowledge of fraud perpetrated by the
owners or controlling individuals should be imputed to the thrift.124 Only the
element of control needs to be addressed. Absent imputation under these
circumstances, the result will be a distortion of corporate principles as
corporations will be able to shift losses for which they are at fault to innocent
or less culpable parties. Further, more plaintiff-clients who sue outside
122See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
123The willingness of courts to fashion new legal principles, which either lack a solid
precedential basis or are based on nebulous "policy" grounds, is explored in greater
depth by Philip A. Lacovara, 'Follow the Money', Should Lawyers and Accountants Pay for
the Sins of Their Clients?, WASH. POST, July 21, 1992, at A19. Mr. Lacovara states in that
article that "it is the naked quest for the money" which is fueling the current trend to
allocate losses to accountants and attorneys, not sound policy. Id. The manipulation of
the Cenco test represents one option for courts to facilitate this loss shifting.
1241n FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992), the court affirmed the jury
instruction given by the district court which stated, "if an employee was acting within
the scope of his authority then his fault would be attributed to the FDIC, standing in the
shoes of the bank. If the employee was not so acting, then no negligence or fault would be
attributed." Id. at 1550 (emphasis supplied). See, e.g., Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC,
489 U.S. 561 (1989)(stating government agency that was appointed receiver stepped into
the shoes of the insolvent thrift); Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 821 F. Supp.
533,535 (N.D. Ill. 1993)("it is a well-known legal principle that a receiver can bring only
those claims belonging to the entity it represents"); Jacobson v. FDIC, 407 F. Supp. 821
(S.D. Iowa 1976)(reasoning that FDIC as receiver stood in the shoes of failed thrift and
enjoyed no greater rights than the failed thrift); 2 RALPH E. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS§ 362, at 619 (3d ed. 1959) ("the receiver of a bank stands
in no better position than the bank stood as a going concern and when the bank was a
party to an illegality, the court will leave the parties where it finds them by refusing
relief to the receiver").
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professionals will be relieved of the requirement to prove a necessary element
of professional negligence actions, reasonable reliance. Once the imputation
analysis has progressed beyond the first factor and requisite control has been
established, the inquiry should then be complete as far as imputation to the
institution from the wrongdoer(s) is concerned. This will avoid the semantics
often engaged in by courts in construing Cenco. The next section addresses
another major distinction between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' opinions,
namely, policy considerations concerning the FDIC's role as receiver or
assignee of a failed thrift. The Fifth Circuit in Ernst & Young reasoned that no
special policy justification warranted special treatment for the FDIC in this
capacity.125 The Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny reached the opposite conclusion
and extended to the FDIC, as receiver, special status.126
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS - WHO SHOULD BEAR CONSEQUENCES OF THRIFT
INDUSTRY FAILURES
If imputation of knowledge from the wrongdoers to the thrift has been
established through ownership and/or requisite control, the FDIC or other
successor in interest should be subject to imputation in the same way that
successors in interest in other situations would be. The sensitive nature of the
financial institution industry's woes, however, has resulted in some courts
engaging in a special brand of adjudication. 127 Courts indulging in this type of
125FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
12 6FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
12 7See O'Melveny, 969 F.2d 744 (reasoning that Ninth Circuit should fashion a special
"federal rule of decision" for FDIC since it was an involuntary successor); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302,311 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing as a "significant" factor
the "intricate regulatory scheme" pursuant to which a failed bank's successor acts to
protect interests of third parties); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 818 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.
1993)(treating FDIC as "simply another assignee" would effectively require the public
to pay for wrongs which it could not have prevented); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp.
1127 (D. Kan. 1992)(determining that FDIC represents the public and is exempt from
imputation of wrongdoer's knowledge); FSLIC v. McGinnis, Juban, Bevan, Mullins &
Patterson, P.C., 808 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. La. 1992)(stating that FDIC is exempt from
imputation in the interest of equity and statutory mission).
The truly disturbing factor about these "loss-shifting" holdings based on "policy"
is that they ignore the fact that in order to perfect the fraudulent, and eventually, fatal,
schemes, concealment from outside professionals is often necessary. "Nothing to date
supports a conclusion that auditors or lawyers were responsible for even a small
percentage of the fraudulent activity." Kolb & Carroll, supra note 8, at 19. Aside from
managerial concealment, the governmental agencies themselves are responsible for the
thrift failures. "In assessing who is responsible for the S & L crisis, it should also not be
forgotten that after... sweeping regulatory changes of the early '80's Congress ... failed
to improve sufficiently the force of federal examiners." Id. "The regulators alone-not
the auditors and not the attorneys-had the authority to prevent S & L's from engaging
in unwise transactions." Id. But see McCoy, supra note 11 (discussing how potentially
effective counterclaims and defenses based on the government's own inaction in the
face of awareness of institutional difficulties have not been accepted by courts).
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policy-making have demonstrated a willingness to exempt the FDIC and its
sister agencies from general principles of law that require a plaintiff to prove
all of the elements necessary to establish its prima facie case.128 A desire to pin
large losses from thrift failures on defendants with financial depth and "make
someone pay" has led some courts, including the Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny,
to hold that even when knowledge normally would be imputed from
managerial wrongdoers to the thrift, "policy" nevertheless dictates that the
governmental successor in interest should not be subject to that defense.129 The
result is that, under the guise of "policy", the FDIC, in the shoes of the failed
institution, is enabled to pursue claims which would fail, due to lack of reliance,
if brought by the actual thrift institution against professional firms.130
A. General Policy Considerations
As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Ernst & Young, such a result would be
erroneous. 131 The Fifth Circuit held that the FDIC, as assignee, could not make
a claim that the thrift could not make. 132 In holding that the FDIC is like any
other assignee or receiver, the Fifth Circuit affirmed traditional corporate law
principles that an assignee obtains the rights of the assignor and nothing
more.
133
In Ernst & Young, the FDIC as a normal assignee was subject to the same
defenses as Western. 134 The FDIC argued that its duty to enlarge the asset pool
128The only real policy sought to be furthered by courts that accord the FDIC special
status is expansion of the asset pool available to pay claims. Paul V. Geoghan, assistant
general counsel for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in New York,
said of the recent $400 million settlement between the government and Ernst & Young,
"it's not unfair to say that the government is asking the accounting profession to
shoulder a really large burden." Marcia Coyle et al., Hard-Hit Accountants Hope to Limit
Liability, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 5.
12 9A comprehensive article which analyzes the importance of having the ability to
refute elements of causation or reliance is presented by McCoy, supra note 10. As
explained by Professor McCoy, most cases brought by the governmental agencies are
premised on "failure to warn" arguments. Id.; seealso Oberly & Morris, supra note 6, for
a thorough discussion of potential claims against professionals and defenses, including
"no reliance."
13 0
"It is entirely another matter... [when] the court simply discards [established legal]
principles and imposes liability based solely on the courts ad hoc and off-the-cuff
evaluation of policy considerations." Brief of Amici Curiae by Arthur Andersen etal. in
Support of Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 1, FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969
F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992)(No. 90-55769), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
13 1FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166,170 (5th Cir. 1992)("[N]o statutory justification
or public policy exists to treat the FDIC differently from other assignees.").
1321d.
1331d. at 170.
1341d.
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supplied the necessary justification for special status.135 But the court rejected
this so-called "policy" and discerned no statutory or other policy to support a
special "immunity" status for the FDIC.136 Alternatively, the FDIC argued that,
even absent reliance on E&Y's audit by Woods or Western, the auditors should
nevertheless be liable for their alleged negligence. 137 The court rejected this
argument because, as assignee of Western, the FDIC was precluded from
making an argument for liability which the thrift itself could not advance. 138
Thus, a thrift's assignee cannot create liability premised on an overriding need
to recover damages. The liability of a defendant is properly determined by
examining the status of the plaintiff and the legal rights that accompany that
status. Rather than engage in "judicial expansion of express powers and rights
granted to the FDIC" to facilitate damage recovery, the Fifth Circuit consistently
applied traditional principles of corporate law in analyzing E&Y's potential
liability.139
A similar approach was taken in FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, in which
the defendant-accountants urged the court to compel the FDIC to produce loan
files for the loans at issue.140 Ordering production, the district court relied on
Eleventh Circuit opinions which declined to confer special status on the FDIC
where document production and debt collection were involved. 141 The Cherry
court acknowledged that while maximizing recovery by the insurance fund
was important, it could not be accomplished by contravening established legal
principles.142 Since relevant statutory authority contained no provision
conferring special status on the FDIC, the court declined to inject its own ad
hoc policy into the regulatory scheme. 143
13 5/d.
13 6 Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170.
13 71d. at 171.
138Id.
13 9/d.
140742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Fla. 1990); see also FDIC v. Gantenbein, No. CIV.A.
90-2303-V, 1992 WL 279772 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,1992)(reasoning that affirmative defense
of contributory negligence was not, as a matter of law, invalid against FDIC); FDIC v.
Regier, Carr & Monroe, No. CIV-92-075-S, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14546 (E.D. Okla. Aug.
17, 1992)(granting summary judgment to accounting firm where there was a lack of
reliance on audits), affd, 996 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Renda, 692 F. Supp. 128
(D. Kan. 1988)(dismissing negligence claim by FDIC as assignee since FDIC was subject
to affirmative defenses that existed against failed institution).
141CIwrry, 742 F. Supp. at 613-14.
1421d. The two Eleventh Circuit opinions analyzed were: FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d
1537 (11th Cir. 1989)(finding no absolute priority for FDIC for recovery of fund); FDIC
v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408 (11th Cir. 1984)(reasoning that FDIC subject to same defense
as any other private party for debt collection).
143 Chwrry, 742 F. Supp. at 615.
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O'Melveny, in contrast to Ernst & Young and Cherry, concluded that the FDIC
occupied a special niche because its succession was involuntary.144 In addition,
the Ninth Circuit noted that succession was "part of an intricate regulatory
scheme.'l 45 But, the court did not explain why the source of succession or nature
of succession should operate to immunize the FDIC in its status as receiver
from defenses that would be valid if asserted against the thrift itself.146
As support for its special status argument, the government has called upon
the courts, including the Ninth Circuit, to extend the D'Oench doctrine, codified
at sections 1821(d)(9) and 1823(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, to
disallow reliance defenses in professional malpractice cases. 147 The D'Oench
doctrine was formulated by the Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhne & Co. v.
FDIC.148 In D'Oench, the FDIC attempted to enforce a note acquired from a
failed thrift.149 The note's maker attempted to assert, as a defense against the
FDIC, that a prior oral side agreement with the failed thrift guaranteed that the
note would never be called for payment. 150 But, the Court held that federal
policy of protecting the FDIC against misrepresentations about an institution's
assets precluded the maker's defense that a prior oral agreement with the failed
14 40'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 751.
14 5 d. at 752.
14 6
"[Plolicy [not disadvantaging the FDIC] does not require giving the FDIC the
ability to transmute lead into gold.... Alchemy is the province of Congress." Sunbelt
Sav., FSB v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.), affd in part on reh'g en banc, 944 F.2d
227(1991).
In reaching its decision to accord special status to the FDIC, Coneau adopted the
Ninth Circuit's misguided interpretation, of the Cenco test. Id. at 1141. The court also
emphasized the involuntariness of the FDIC's succession, similar to O'Melveny. Id.
Finally, the court balanced the tort liability policies of compensation and deterrence
against the probable effects that refusal to subject the FDIC to the same defenses as the
failed financial institution would have on the accounting profession's ability to defend
against similar claims in the future. Id. Summarily, the court found no inequity "in
withdrawing from the Accountants' litigation arsenal a defense that would normally be
available." Id. at 1142. The court further reasoned that accountants could still advance
an argument that the wrongdoers' actions and knowledge were the cause of the losses.
Id. But since this type of evidence is properly permitted as an offensive strategy, it is
thoroughly inconsistent to bar exactly the same type of evidence for purposes of the
defense of lack of reasonable reliance. Id.
14 7Cherry, 742 F.Supp. at 614-15; see, e.g., FDIC v. Wright, 963 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1992)(discussing the fact that there was no indication that Congress intended the FDIC
have greater priority than other creditors in the context of professional negligence
action); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)(cautioning that deference to
Congress should guide the court's decision in denying special status or priority to FDIC
where no such priority appeared on the face of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
148315 U.S. 447 (1942).
149 1d. at 450.
150Id.
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thrift had been formed. 151 This was because the FDIC had to be able to rely on
a failed institution's records in order to properly assess solvency.152
A purchase and assumption agreement between the FDIC and a failed thrift
similar to the one at issue in D'Oench provides an alternative to liquidation of
a thrift's assets. The FDIC must be able to rely on the thrift's books when it
conducts its quick review of a failed thrift's books. In addition to the immediacy
of its decision, the FDIC is acting as a receiver, rather than an assignee, when
it participates in a purchase and assumption agreement. The time constraints
and unique status of the FDIC in the context of purchase and assumption
agreements distinguish such cases from professional accounting or law firms.
Further, these factors explain why the D'Oench doctrine should be limited to
the context of receivership arising out of a purchase and assumption
agreement.
The effect of D'Oench has been to eliminate defenses in cases brought by the
government based on secret side agreements forgiving non-payment between
a failed institution and the borrower. In professional negligence cases, the FDIC
has argued that the special protection given to it in suits to collect on loans
should be expanded to apply in situations where the FDIC steps in as receiver
for a thrift rendered insolvent by secretive and fraudulent insider
misconduct.153 However, the FDIC's argument for expansion of the statutory
protection is not well-founded, as shown by Ernst & Young and Cherry. First,
the D'Oench doctrine and its protection are limited to fact situations involving
alleged oral side agreements between the failed institution and third parties.
The reason for this is that such claims sound in contract, whereas professional
malpractice claims sound in tort. Furthermore, neither the D'Oench doctrine
nor its statutory counterpart suggests that the FDIC should be exempt from the
application of traditional corporate principles when serving as an assignee. To
extend this doctrine to professional negligence situations would effectively
1511d. at 450-51.
152Id.
15312 U.S.C. § § 1821(d)(9), 1823(e)(1991). Generally, these sections list certain
requirements that must be satisfied in order for agreements, purporting to reduce, limit
or defeat a financial institution's interests, to be valid. To satisfy these requirements, the
agreement must be:
(1) in writing,
(2) executed by the depository institution,
(3) approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan
committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee,
and,
(4) continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository
institution.
Examples of the government's attempts to extend the D'Oench doctrine to the
professional malpractice context can be seen in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994); FDIC v. Ernst & Young,
967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D.
Fla. 1990).
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exempt the FDIC from having to prove causation, an element of its prima facie
case. There is no precedent for excusing a plaintiff from proving a longstanding
element of a common-law claim simply to facilitate recovery and to do so
would do incalculable violence to settled common law. In the context of a
professional negligence action arising out of fraudulent activity by a failed
thrift's owners or officers, the FDIC's knowledge of such high-level
misconduct would not necessarily prevent the consummation of a purchase
and assumption agreement. The decision whether to enter into such an
agreement is made by examining account balances, among other bookkeeping
entries, to ascertain liquidated numbers. Owners', managers', or officers' fraud
or other wrongful activities, even if known, cannot be similarly reduced to a
liquidated figure. Thus, these activities do not produce a certain or estimated
dollar amount to be considered pursuant to choosing purchase and assumption
or liquidation.
Moreover, there is nothing in the statutes themselves or their comments
which suggest that Congress intended the D'Oench doctrine to apply to
professional malpractice actions. The policy behind the codification of the
D'Oench doctrine arose out of a need to protect the reliability of the cursory
inspection of a thrift's books undertaken by a regulatory agency. In sharp
contrast, the policy sought to be furthered by the government through
extension of D'Oench is enlargement of its asset pool. The distinctive policy
underlying the codification of the D'Oench doctrine is, therefore, demonstrative
of D'Oench's inapplicability to professional malpractice actions.
The United States Supreme Court, in O'Melveny, agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's rationale and rejected the Ninth Circuit's position that federal policy,
as embodied in the D'Oench doctrine, supported the recognition of a special
status for the FDIC.154
The Court rested its decision on two distinct grounds. First, the Court
admonished that the creation of federal common law, which results in a special
status for the FDIC, would impermissibly alter the regulatory scheme of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA"). 155 As noted by the Court, several regulatory provisions expressly
provide special federal rules regarding FDIC claims and defenses.156 Thus, the
creation of a special status for the FDIC, in situations not specifically provided
for in FIRREA, would run afoul of the regulatory framework already in
place.157
The second ground for the Court's decision involved the well-recognized
rarity of cases in which special federal rules may be justifiably created by the
1540'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
1551d. at 2054.
1561d. at 2054 (citations omitted).
157 d. at 2054 (stating that "additional 'federal common-law' exceptions is not to
'supplement' this scheme, but to alter it").
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judiciary.158 The Court explained that such cases are limited to situations
involving significant conflict between federal policies and the application of
state law.159
In O'Melveny, the Court found no significant conflict between federal
policies concerning the failure of financial institutions and state law.160 The
Court determined that both the task of conducting state-by-state research to
ascertain the FDIC's rights and liabilities and the reduction of potential
uncertainty as to these rights and liabilities were ordinary consequences of
FDIC litigation which did not rise to the level of a federal interest, to justify a
special status for the FDIC under the guise of federal common law.161
The Court then addressed the government's contention that the federal
government's interest in preventing the depletion of the federal deposit
insurance fund supported the creation of a special status for the FDIC. First,
the Court stated that neither the regulatory scheme nor prior law provided a
definite level for the insurance fund.162 Next, the Court recognized that, in the
absence of federal policy mandating that the insurance fund should always
prevail in litigation, it lacked authority to create new causes of action for the
purpose of enriching the fund. 163 The government's argument for the creation
of a special status for the FDIC would necessarily result in the creation of new
causes of action to enrich the insurance fund because the FDIC would not be
subject to the same defenses, nor would it bear the same burdens of proof, that
generally apply in similar litigation which does not involve the FDIC.164 That
is precisely the consequence sought to be avoided by the United States Supreme
Court.
As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, the rationale of the Ninth Circuit
and other courts that have constructed a special status for the FDIC and other
successor governmental agencies does not withstand scrutiny. The common
theme among these courts to justify this status is the obvious desire to facilitate
damage recovery.165 The Ninth Circuit court explained that, if settled corporate
principles were applied and the FDIC was subject to the same defenses as the
failed institution, the regulatory scheme would be frustrated since the asset
158 0'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2055.
1591d.
1601d.
16 11d.
162 0'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2055.
163 1d.
1 64 d. The Court compared the government's argument in O'Melveny to other cases
in which the Court rejected similar arguments, premised on an alleged "policy" to
facilitate greater recoveries. Id. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)).
1650'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 752.
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pool would be less.166 This preclusion from increasing the asset pool would,
then, reduce the receiver's discretionary powers for distribution of the total
assets to interested parties.167 The fallacy pf this explanation is that it
presupposes a duty of receivers to maximize the total asset pool available by
totally ignoring established legal defenses such as lack of reasonable reliance
by the institution. The true duties of a receiver are preservation and equitable
distribution, not maximization, of the asset pool.168
The simultaneous creation of special statuses and immunities and rejection
of traditional legal principles is an inappropriate method to achieve damage
recovery. The inappropriateness of this methodology has been starkly
illustrated by the FDIC's own practice of advancing inconsistent strategies in
related litigation. 169 The Ninth Circuit's approach is violative of traditional
corporate and receivership principles, and it serves only as an incentive for
plaintiff-successors to manipulate precedent and argue inconsistent theories
depending which posture is most favorable to recovery. In light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's declaration that no special status must be given to the FDIC,
the Ninth Circuit on remand must look to California state law concerning
imputation of knowledge, rather than judicially-created federal policy, as a
166 Id.
16 7See H.R. Rep. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1989)("ITlhe FDIC authorities
and duties as ... receiver... essentially parallel those heretofore exercised ....").
168 California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1991).
169The current atmosphere of record-setting judgments and settlements may be
characterized as the public's call for retribution for the huge losses suffered as a result
of so many institutional failures. Two authors have addressed the current environment
in this way: "If the 1980s were known as the decade of greed, it is doubtless correct that
the 1990s ultimately will be known as the decade of retribution." Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie
L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal: An Era of New Stantards for Professionals?, in ADVANCED
SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1992, at 713, 734 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 784, 1992).
What is particularly disturbing is that the FDIC has alternately urged and opposed
imputation depending on which approach is most beneficial to it under the
circumstances. Like O'Melveny, California Union, 948 F.2d at 565, involved the failure of
American Diversified. In California Union, the government sought to recover on
insurance policies that did not provide payment unless knowledge of the fraudulent
activity was obtained within a particular time frame. Id. The government, as assignee
or receiver, did not file its insurance claim until after American Diversified's insolvency
drove it out of business. Id. However, as assignee, the thrift's knowledge of the fraud,
imputed from Sahni, Day and Pope's knowledge, occurred before the expiration of the
time frame for filing the claim. Id. Thus, as assignee, the government argued for
imputation of knowledge and against special status to allow the FSLIC to recover under
insurance policies.
Conversely, the government argued for special status and against imputation in
O'Melveny to facilitate recovery against the failed thrift's outside attorneys. O'Melveny,
969 F.2d 744. It is difficult to discern how these contrary results, arising out of the same
thrift failure, can be said to further the tort liability objectives of victim compensation
and deterrence or fairness and consistency in the judicial process.
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basis for determining whether the FDIC's claims against outside proof will
succeed.
B. Effect on the Cost and Availability of Professional Service
Subsequent opinions that have perpetuated the O'Melveny rationale for
according special status to the FDIC or other government successors in interest
have done so on the basis that outside professionals, rather than the public,
should bear the loss.170 In FDIC v. Marsiglia, for example, the court emphasized
that the FDIC owed a duty to the public at large.171 The court determined that
imputation would defeat the purpose of the FDIC: to protect the public against
the losses which were precipitated by fraudulent activities.172 But this
conclusion, that shifting losses away from the insurance companies toward
professional firms will somehow insulate the public from the economic impacts
of the financial institution crisis, fails to consider the indirect impacts this
shifting will have on the economy.173 Many accounting and law firms are
simply abandoning services for the banking industry altogether.174 The end
17OSee FDIC v. Regier, Carr & Monroe, 996 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1993)(determining that
knowledge of wrongdoer president of failed thrift was imputable to thrift and FDIC as
receiver); Resolution Trust Co. v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(concluding
that equitable defenses good against the thrift should not be available against its
receiver); FDIC v. Marsiglia, No. CIV.A.90-4999, 1992 WL 348454 (E.D. La. Nov. 18,
1992)(finding that FDIC's duty to public justifies special immunity from affirmative
defenses); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Kan. 1992)(adopting O'Melveny
"special status" for FDIC and finding no hardship for accountants where the government
is not subjected to the same defenses that the failed thrift would); FDIC v. Nathan, 804
F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Tex. 1992)(holding no imputation in lawsuit against attorneys); FDIC
v. KPMG Peat Marwick, No. 92-195, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
1992)(reasoning that FDIC seeks to provide remedies to innocent parties, so it bears no
responsibility for predecessor's inequitable activity); FSLIC v. McGinnis, Juban, Bevan,
Mullins & Patterson, 808 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. La. 1992)(stating that rule must be that
FDIC is exempt from equitable defenses to preserve equitable principles). But see FDIC
v. Gatenbein, No. CIV.A.90-2303-V, 1992 WL 279772 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,1992)(reasoning
that allegation of negligence against failed financial institution should apply to the FDIC
and subject the FDIC to the same defenses as the failed institution).
17 1FDIC v. Marsiglia, No. ClV.A.90-4999,1992 WL 348454 (E.D. La. Nov. 18,1992).
1721d. at *5.
173 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
174 0ne commentator has stated:
In response [to the FDIC's position], accountants could argue that no
good public policy interest will be served by bankrupting and destroying
the major accounting firms of the United States through unprecedented
lawsuits and damage awards.
With few national financially solvent accounting firms remaining,
accounting services will be more scarce and cost-prohibitive, resulting
in fewer audits or less thorough audits, which, in turn, will create
greater opportunities for fraud and corruption in corporations and
financial opportunities. Thus, accountants could argue that imposing
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result is that firms who are willing to service this industry will be fewer in
number and higher in price.175
Some of these effects are already being experienced.176 Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott, a Pittsburgh law firm, recently settled with the FDIC for $24
million.177 As a result, it has voluntarily chosen not to serve as general counsel
to savings and loans institutions nor will it represent S & Us in regulatory
matters.178 In the future, some of the nation's accounting firms may also shy
away from perceived "high risk" industries, including financial institutions. 179
To better cope with more costly insurance, accounting and law firms alike have
been implementing "risk reduction" strategies.180 The country's ninth largest
accounting firm, McGladrey & Pullen, has traditionally avoided thrift clients,
and in the recent past it has implemented risk reduction policies for other
industry segments identified as "high risk." 18 1 Those policies include a
stringent client acceptance process and annual client evaluations. 18 2 The
liability on accounting firms would not be in the long-term best interest
of the public.
Jan S. Blaising, Are the Accountants Accountable? Auditor Liability in the Savings and Loan
Crisis, 25 IND. L. REV. 475, 490 (1991).
175Three recent surveys showed that only 53% of California CPA firms will take on
audit engagements; 32% of CPA firms, in general, are discontinuing audit work in high
risk industries, and 56% of mid-size CPA firms will not become involved with clients
in high risk areas. Arthur Andersen et al., The Liability Crisis in theUnited States: Impact
on the Accounting Profession, A Statement of Position 5 (Aug. 6,1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW). Since less of the more
affordable small to mid-size alternative firms are available, there will likely be
corresponding reductions in the numbers of start-up businesses, as key professional
services will be out of reach.
176 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
177 Larry Smith, Still Reeling in tihe Wake of S & L Suits, Law Firms Grope for Solutions,
PRENTICE HALL L. AND Bus., Aug. 3, 1992.
178Id.
179See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
180David C. Walters, Liability Crisis Threatens Atulitors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
28, 1992, at 9.
181Id.
182New York attorney, Melvyn I. Weiss has represented plaintiffs alleging claims of
negligence by auditors and he makes the following suggestions to accounting firms to
contain risk:
- Rotate audits between firms to maintain impartiality
- Improve training for on site auditors
- Do not permit audit clients to hire employees from the accounting firm.
Walters, supra note 173.
Representative Edward J. Markey, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee's subcommittee on finance has urged legislation that would require auditors
to notify senior managers, or boards of directors, about improper accounting practices
within an organization. Both the organization and the outside auditor would be
required to report the improprieties to the SEC. John H. Cushman, Jr., Bank Failures Raise
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segments classified as "high risk" by McGladrey & Pullen and its accounting
industry peers include: financial institutions and services, insurance
companies, securities brokers and dealers, real estate investment firms and
high technology firms.183 The impact of the industry-wide risk reduction on
members of "high risk" segments will likely resemble the effects felt by
Americans who seek treatment for their ailments. Those most in need of
professional services will simply not be able to obtain them. This problem is
especially acute for companies who are just getting started and need
professionals to assist with initial public offerings.
This risk reduction adversely affects the ability of many start-up companies
to operate and grow, since professional services are more scarce, and where
available, costly.184 It is the up-and-coming, untried companies which pose
the greatest risk potential for professionals should the companies fail. In 1991
alone, $477 million were expended by the six largest public accounting firms
to settle and defend lawsuits. 185 This figure was up from $404 million in 1990,
and projections for 1992 show even larger expenditure figures. 186 The
percentage of national accounting revenues represented by these figures is 9
percent and 7.7 percent respectively. 187 With accounting firms facing litigation
expenses approaching one-tenth of overall income, the nation will likely
a Question: Who Does the Final Audit?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at 6E. Currently,
auditors need only notify management of improper accounting practices. Lee Berton,
Holding Accountants Accountable, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1992, at A18. The proposed
whistle-blower legislation could have serious ramifications for firms seeking to retain
and solicit new clients. It is unclearwhether this legislation would apply only to financial
institutions or whether its application would extend to all companies.
183Walters, supra note 173; see also Arthur Andersen, supra note 168.
184The effects of the so-called "scapegoat litigation" were measured in a study by the
American Tort Reform Association. Mark A. Hofman, Study Says Joint and Several
Liability to Hurt Economy; Report Blasts S & L Litigation, Bus. INs., Aug. 17, 1992, at 2. The
following results of the study show the far reaching economic effects of this litigation:
- An increase in the cost of raising equity capital by as much as 1.3% over the
next five years due to increased costs of legal, audit and investment banking services.
- Increase in the cost of capital varying considerably according to the amount
raised.
- Average annual decline of $6 billion in business' fixed investment - during
five-year period.
- Concurrent decline in labor productivity.
- Increased inflation due to drop in investment and productivity.
- Drop in GNP of an average of $17.8 billion in 1991 dollars per year during
five-year period.
- Loss of as many as 224,000 jobs over the period.
Id. For specific effects on the accounting industry see supra text accompanying notes
170-98.
185See Arthur Andersen, supra note 168.
1861d.
187Id.
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experience professional firm failures and audits clearly will become more
costly.188
C. Insurance Costs and Related Effects on Professional Firms
It has become obvious, in the wake of monumental verdicts, claims and
settlements against professional firms, that a substantial motivator for
according government regulators "special status" is the potentially greener
pastures that these firms represent.189 It has become commonplace to include
accounting and law firms as defendants in lawsuits, since the firms often are
the only entities left with sufficient financial resources or insurance policies to
pay for recovery.190 Because these firms represent the most realistic sources for
enlarging the asset pool of the bankrupt entity, it is not surprising that some
courts are tempted to facilitate that recovery under the guise of equity, policy
and fairness.191
Those firms that remain viable will still experience the economic impact of
the mounting litigation, primarily in the form of higher liability premiums. 192
18 8See Breznick, supra note 3, noting that Ernst & Young's record settlement occurred
almost exactly two years after Laventhol & Horwath collapsed, at least in part, under
the pressure of pending litigation.
18 9Accountants are currently facing more than $9 billion in claims, while major law
firms face multi-million dollar claims. Lacovara, supra note 123. '"he search is on for
other 'deep pockets' who can help defray the cost." Id. at 9. Jon Madonna, Chairman of
KPMG Peat Marwick stated, "Ambulance chasers used to be confined to automobile
accidents...[njow... business accidents are a lot more valuable." Walters, supra note 173,
at 9.
Many in the accounting industry feel that the reason for the tremendous lawsuits
is the government's need to do "anything they can to replenish the [insurance] fund
regardless of the source." Barbara Rehm, Suits Target Deep Pockets of Accountants, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 13, 1990, at 1.
190 0ne commentator has suggested, however, that the existing collective insurance
coverage of the larger accounting firms will be insufficient to cover the total value of
estimated claims. Jeff Dash, The S & L Crisis: Should Accountants Be Accountable?, 17 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 365 (1993). Another reason for including professional firms as defendants is
the likelihood of settlement as sheer volume of litigation makes defending an
uneconomical prospect for many firms. RayJ. Groves, Chairman of Ernst & Young, had
this to say about the firm's recent $400 million settlement: "It is the only realistic solution
to an endless stream of lawsuits that would have been even more expensive to defend."
Coyle, supra note 130, at 5. In another article, Mr. Groves also stated that "[clontesting
each lawsuit would have meant many years of almost continuous litigation - and an
unacceptable drain of the firm's time and resources." Mark A. Hofman & Gavin Souter,
Ernst & Young Settlenent Praised: Pact Called 'Fabulous Deal'for Accountant, Insurers, BUS.
INS., Nov. 30,1992, at 1. The message is clear. With the firms' defensive arsenal greatly
depleted, the prospect of continuing legal battles is too costly to justify. Professional
firms are either faced with enormous litigation costs and a small chance of vindication
or a quick resolution in the form of a settlement.
191 See Walters, supra note 173.
192Three hundred million dollars of E & Y's recent four hundred million dollar
settlement was paid by insurance companies. Hofman & Souter, supra note 183; see also
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Ninety-six percent of accounting firms with more than fifty certified public
accountants have experienced at least a three hundred percent increase in
liability insurance premiums between 1985 and 1991.193 In some cases,
however, accounting firms have opted to "go bare" because new, higher
insurance premiums and higher deductible amounts are simply not
affordable. 194 Of course, the danger in "going bare" is that a firm may be
completely wiped out financially by one lawsuit. As already indicated, the
price of defending or settling a specious claim for a professional firm may be
too high, and, as a result, the business may be forced to close its doors.195
Under the rule of joint and several liability, professional firms are especially
vulnerable to attack.196 Even assuming a firm is only marginally culpable,
under joint and several liability, that firm can be held responsible for an entire
judgment.197 In certain jurisdictions, if a firm is found by a jury to be only one
percent responsible for an institution's failure, it may have to pay one hundred
percent of the judgment if, as is usually the case, the other parties at fault, such
as directors and officers, are judgment-proof.1 98 Such a result is clearly
inequitable.
D. Public Misunderstanding of the Auditor's Role
The courts' construction of a special status to avoid the operation of
traditional legal principles is deemed acceptable not only because recovery is
Christine Woolsey, Large Accounting and Law Firms See E & 0 Rate Increases, Bus. INs.,
Apr. 27,1992, at 52 (stating tha t"S & L settlements have pushed [premium] trends along
swiftly"). One expert's estimate has predicted that Ernst & Young will immediately
experience a twenty-five percent increase in its insurance premiums as a result of its
settlement. Breznick, supra note 3.
193 See Arthur Andersen, supra note 168.
194 Professional firms with potential liability for financial institution clients are having
particular difficulty obtaining maximum coverage or, in some cases, any coverage.
Woolsey,supra note 185. A once-prominent underwriter, National Union Fire Insurance
Co., ceased underwriting Big Six accounting firms, and it has restricted its underwriting
for law firms. Id. National Union will issue coverage to law firms with financial
institution clients after securing higher deductibles from the firms. Id.
195See supra note 182.
196Many in the accounting and law professions have advocated proportionate
liability, so firms will only be liable for amounts of damages "directly attributable" to
their actions. Walters, supra note 173; see also Arthur Andersen, supra note 168, at 6
("[P]roportionate liability will help restore balance and equity to the liability system by
discouraging specious suits and giving blameless defendants the incentive to prove their
case in court rather than settle.").
197Hofman & Souter, supra note 183, at 1. Under joint and several liability, "all
defendants found to be liable may have to pay for the full amount of damages, no matter
what portion of the harm their misconduct actually caused." Id.
198See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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facilitated, but also because the general public misperceives the responsibility
undertaken by outside professionals, especially auditors.199
The public misconception about accounting firms' responsibilities, even
before the S & L crisis, was a belief that a firm's audit opinion constituted a
"clean bill of health" for the entity audited.200 Thus, the misguided rationale of
O'Melveny and courts that have followed O'Melveny is understandably
appealing to the poorly-informed, general public, many of whom were
customers damaged by thrift failures.
Contrary to popular belief, however, the true objectives of an audit are to
detect inadvertent mistakes made by management in their financial records
and to give an opinion on the reasonableness of figures reported.201 An audit
is by no means a guarantee, nor are auditors insurers against managerial fraud
or other internal treachery.202 This concept was aptly summed up by Chief
Justice Malcolm Lucas of the California Supreme Court in this way: "An
auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound."203
VI. CONCLUSION
Three hundred million dollars, four hundred million dollars, five hundred
million dollars ... enormous claims and settlements like these are projected to
continue for at least several more years.204 One managing partner in an
accounting firm summarized the liability crisis facing firms in this way: "There
1991t should be noted that a professional's responsibility may be expanded or
contracted by the terms of an express contract.
2 00 See Travis M. Dodd, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justifying
Disparate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 CEO. L. J. 909, 915
(1992)(discussing the fact that unqualified audit reports only show an auditor's belief
that financials are "fairly presented", not that the entity has a "clean bill of health"). The
author states that the "expectation gap" between the public's perceptions of the auditors'
responsibilities and the auditors' own perceptions is widest in the area of detection of
management fraud or theft. Id. at 916. Recent, well-publicized settlements and claims
have apparently widened the chasm, rather than contracting it. See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
201See Robert B. Hale, Auditor Liability Under the DTPA: Can It Get Any Worse for
Accountants?, 44 BAYLOR L. REv. 313 (1992)(noting that role of independent auditor is to
express an opinion); Dodd, supra note 192 (stating that auditor has duty to detect items
which result in material misstatements in financials);scealso Oberly & Morris, supra note
6 (explaining that audits must be in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Standards and Principles, and that auditor responsibility does not include a guarantee
of accuracy).
202 Dodd, supra note 192, at 919 ("[Als a general proposition '[ajuditors do not cause
business failures, nor can they prevent them from happening."').
2 03Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal.), reli'g denied, niodified, No. S017199, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 5583 (Nov. 12, 1992).
204See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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may be a settlement or lawsuit out there that could kill any one of us."205
Accounting and law firms that are sued by the FDIC and other regulatory
agencies for professional malpractice have two options, either to defend their
actions in court or reach a settlement. The former has proven far less viable in
the past two years as some courts have become far more willing to exempt the
FDIC from the plaintiff's usual burden to prove all of the elements of a
professional negligence claim, including reasonable reliance.206
It is true that the thrift disasters of the last decade have been costly. It is also
true that those who bear responsibility should be made to answer for their
culpability. However, the allure of achieving these goals, as well as deterring
similar future conduct, have no validity when innocent or marginally culpable
parties are hampered in their ability to defend themselves. A balance must be
struck in the context of well-settled legal principles.
In the eyes of some courts, the search for a scapegoat to shoulder the losses
experienced as a result of many failed savings and loan and thrift institutions
seems to be over. The "deep-pocketed" professional firms have filled that role
quite nicely. Stripped of their ability to formulate a strong defense and exposed
to potential financial ruin from rising insurance costs and a continuing barrage
of lawsuits, these scapegoats may soon become endangered or extinct. These
are consequences that our national economy can ill afford to suffer.
ALISON L. bRAKE
205Walters, supra note 173, at 9 (quoting LeRoy E. Martin, national managing partner
of McGladrey & Patten).
206 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion about the
failure of deterrence and loss spreading policies as justifications for shifting losses to
accountants, see John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort
Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988).
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